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A Novel IGDT-Based Method to Find the Most
Susceptible Points of Cyberattack Impacting
Operating Costs of VSC-Based Microgrids
Masoud Davari∗, Senior Member, IEEE, Hamed Nafisi, Mohamad-Amin Nasr, and Frede Blaabjerg, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper proposes a novel mathematical approach
to deal with cyberattacks impacting on modernized microgrid’s
tertiary control. Modernized microgrids use many entities based
on voltage-source converters to form the fully integrated power
and energy system. Having such a power and energy system
for modernized microgrids necessitates engineers considering
cybersecurity and addressing its effects from the beginning of
designing and building systems. Using innovative mathematical
tools based on information gap decision theory (also known as
IGDT), this paper incorporates the data integrity attacks into
tertiary controls of the fully integrated power and energy system
of modernized microgrids. The proposed methodology [named
cyberattack-tolerant tertiary control (CT2C) herein] is able to
effectively find the most susceptible points of cyberattack in mod-
ernized microgrids when both severe and negligible uncertainties
caused by cyberattacks take place. They are able to include both
severe data integrity attacks and negligible ones (or undetectable
attacks). Here, the most vulnerable points of cyberattack cause
the most impactful changes in the tertiary control’s principal
objective, which is minimizing the operating cost of the whole
modernized microgrids. In this regard, this paper describes a
hypothesis, and in supporting that, comparative simulation re-
sults are given. The outcomes generated by the General Algebraic
Modeling System (commonly known as GAMS) environment are
able to provide researchers and engineers with appropriate maps
for sensitive points of cyberattack. Using the proposed CT2C,
investments in modernized microgrids cybersecurity will be
more accurate and, more importantly, mathematically optimized.
Finally, potential ways to implement the proposed methodology
are elaborated.
Index Terms—Cyberattack (CA), fully integrated power and
energy system (FIPES), information gap decision theory (IGDT),
modernized microgrid (MMG), operating cost (OC), points of
cyberattack (PoCA), tertiary control.
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l Line between the ith and jth buses
n Battery energy storage system unit
z Uncertain parameter
Variables
δCA Tolerable increment in operating cost consid-
ering the vulnerability of tertiary controls to
cyberattacks [pu]
δi,kt Voltage angle [radian]
κz Uncertainty horizon
κz,kt Uncertainty horizons at each time interval in
the information gap decision theory (IGDT)-
based tertiary control
λg,kt Shutdown decision (“1” = shutdown and “0”
= otherwise)
µg,kt Start-up decision (“1” = start-up and “0” =
otherwise)
Π System input/output structure
Θg,kt On/off decision (“1” = on and “0” = off)




Charging/discharging decision (“1” = allowed
and “0” = not allowed)
OC Operating cost [$]
Pg,kt , Qg,kt Active/reactive power of generating units [pu]




Battery energy storage system discharg-
ing/charging power [pu]
RoU Radius of uncertainty defined by variables
KDG, KBESS, KPV, KWT, and KLoad for dif-
ferent entities [pu]




Down/up time of generating units [h]
Vi,kt Bus voltage [pu]
Parameters




n Charging/discharging efficiencies of battery
energy storage systems
θi,j Angle of elements in Ybus [radian]
ϕ̃z,kt Predicted value of uncertain parameters
ϕz,kt Value of uncertain parameters
ag Quadratic term of cost function [$/(kWh)2]
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bg Linear term of cost function [$/kWh]
Csdng /C
sup
g Shut-down/start-up cost of generating units
[$]
cg Constant term of cost function [$/h]
Gl Conductance of lth branch




g Maximum/minimum active power of generat-
ing units [pu]
PDi,kt/QDi,kt Active/reactive power demand [pu]
PVi,kt Active power of photovoltaic units [pu]
PWi,kt/QWi,ktActive/reactive power of wind turbines [pu]
Qmaxg /Q
min
g Maximum/minimum reactive power of gener-
ating units [pu]
Rdng Ramp down rate of generating units [pu/h]
Rupg Ramp up rate of generating units [pu/h]
RESkt Spinning reserve requirement [pu]
Sbase Base apparent power [kVA]
SOCn,kt State of charge of battery energy storage
systems [pu]
SOCmaxn Maximum state of charge of battery energy
storage systems [pu]




g Minimum down/up time of generating units
[h]
Yi,j Absolute value of elements in Ybus [pu]
Sets
χkt Decision variables in the IGDT principles
B System buses
E Battery energy storage systems





Πmin Minimum system requirements in the IGDT
principles
ψz,kt Possible values of uncertain parameters in the
IGDT principles
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH the power networks have been utilized by“micro” grids using localized generation and a limited
distribution network—which dates back to the beginning of the
power industry—the usage of new microgrids in the traditional
interconnected power systems has again started since 2002 [1].
Although those microgrids have been making use of com-
munications and controls, they have been less dependent on
advanced communication systems and sophisticated controls
(similar to conventional power systems). Once smart grids
have started come into existence, the traditional microgrids
regard as a great assess to those power networks’ operation
and controls. One of the essential elements in smart grids is
having more advanced, revolutionary, modern controls, along
with communications, as per the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 (EISA-2007), which was approved by
the U.S. Congress in January 2007 and signed into law in
December 2007 [2].
Furthermore, the energy sector has made remarkable
progress in integrating energy storage systems (e.g., battery
systems) into current power networks forming ac/dc grids
significantly. They may create either multi-infeed ac/dc power
systems (e.g., in transmission systems) or hybrid ac/dc mi-
crogrids (e.g., in distribution systems)—under the umbrella of
smart grids [3]–[12]. Once traditional hybrid ac/dc microgrids
are highly employed in serving modernized smart grids, they
need to have advanced controls. Those microgrids have been
named “modernized microgrids” (MMG) in this research as
they are equipped with sophisticated controls and communica-
tions. In smart grids, the MMG concept adds many benefits to
the operation, control, and demand supply within commercial
power systems.
The utilization of battery energy storage systems (BESSs)
in microgrids was proposed when their paradigm was
introduced [1]. MMGs will benefit from the usage of BESSs,
which are presently mature enough to be applied in the bulk
electric power generation and electrical energy storage. Bulk
generation of BESSs (in the power industry) has recently been
feasible—as BESS’s technology is now mature enough to be
used in pilot microgrid projects [8], [10], [13]—compared to
its achievability in 2002.
MMGs take advantage of a lot of entities using power
electronic converters, mainly in the form of voltage-source
converters (VSCs) [12], [14]. It is noteworthy that this research
considers VSCs since the other types of power electronic
converters [e.g., forced-commutated current-source converters
(CSCs)] have not been as widely used for applications in
power systems. CSCs have not been as widely used for
applications in power systems as they require controllable
bipolar electronic switches, whose widespread commercial
supply is not fully established by the power semiconductor
industry yet. Although bipolar versions of the Gate-Turn-Off
Thyristor (commonly known as GTO) and the Integrated Gate-
Commutated Thyristor (also known as IGCT) are commer-
cially available, they have limitations on switching speed,
thus being primarily utilized in very high-power electronic
converters. Also, for the power range of microgrids (and also
MMGs), the VSCs are the dominant technology in the power
electronics industry [14]. The VSCs to which this paper refers
should interface different subsystems. That is why they have
been referred to as the general term of “VSC”s since their
mode of operation is not required to be specified as per the
scope of this research. In other words, VSCs may interface a
dc subsystem to an ac subsystem—with either a unidirectional
power flow [7], [15] or a bidirectional one [12]—depending
on the required power flow. A converter is called a rectifier
if the flow of average power is from the ac side to the dc
side, while it is called an inverter if the average power flow
is from the dc side to the ac side. A similar statement can
be discussed for the buck, boost, buck/boost, and more. As a
result, the term VSC is kept without loss of generality in this
work [14].
A future VSC-based MMG will employ a new trend in its
power structure, called a fully integrated power and energy
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system (FIPES)—thanks to the integration of BESSs—as
discussed in this paper. Fig. 1 shows a concept of a VSC-
based MMG (hereinafter, referred to as MMG for ease of
reference) with an FIPES. FIPESs have a similar structure
to what is employed in traditional power systems, but they
substantially integrate energy storage units. Those units are
mostly in the form of BESSs based on the presently mature,
industrial energy storage technologies. MMGs’ FIPES should
be given special consideration for their studies and analyses
because the technologies related to storing electrical energy
have been rapidly evolving in the power industry. As such,
they bring more flexibility and contribute to the performances
of MMGs. FIPESs are able to integrate energy systems into
power systems to feed the needs of MMGs for operation,
energy management, electricity market (e.g., energy arbitrage),
power quality requirements, dynamics, and control.
As regards the hierarchical controls of all microgrids, they
have various time intervals and horizons—ranging from mil-
liseconds (i.e., inner control loop, as well as the primary
controls), milliseconds to seconds (i.e., secondary controls),
and seconds to minutes (i.e., tertiary controls). Briefly speak-
ing, they are detailed as follows. Inner control loops, as
well as the primary controls, are regulating the voltage and
frequency to their reference values. The secondary control is
adjusting the deviations in both voltage and frequency. The
tertiary control manages the power flow of the microgrid
via controlling voltage amplitude/phase of buses. Tertiary
control is the highest (and hence the slowest) control level
that considers economic concerns in the optimal operation
of the microgrid—at the sampling time of Ts ranging from
minutes to hours—and manages the optimal power flow and
energy between the microgrid and the main power network.
Therefore, it considers the microgrids’ operating costs, as well
as their efficiency economically. This paper has focused on
the tertiary controls utilizing advanced communication infras-
tructures, which enable “modernized microgrids” to function
optimally for power flow. Such structures will be supervised
by a central control and an energy management system at
the highest level, also known as the “tertiary control.” In
MMGs, the tertiary control is able to benefit from distributed
dispatching, which allows online actions for every load change
in real-time, in direct contrast to longer time scales with static
demand input in the centralized schemes. It achieves more
flexibility in control under issues such as transmission delay,
information failure, and so on, thus improving the economic
profile for optimal utilization of resources. Nevertheless, it has
cyber layer imperfections (see [16] and references therein.)
Cyber threats nowadays require designers to consider cy-
bersecurity and remove (or attenuate) its effects from the
outset of designing and building engineering systems. This
research will fundamentally investigate this requirement for
the challenging application of tertiary controls using presently
practical, industrial, networked controls. Several studies and
industrial works have considered power grid cybersecurity
issues, concerns, and solutions [17]–[24]. Additionally, many
works on microgrid operations and controls focus on the
economic aspects of microgrids (see [25]–[27] and references
therein).
For instance, the authors of [16] have studied two cost-
prioritized droop schemes for distributed generators in a rural
or islanded microgrid. In [28], the authors have proposed a
multi-agent energy storage system aggregation as a tool for
scaling energy management to low voltage microgrids with
distributed energy storage systems using the microgrid’s ter-
tiary controls. In [29], the researchers have proposed a voltage-
frequency management technique that retains those quantities
within acceptable limits in remote islanded microgrids and
is activated when existing techniques for controlling energy
storage systems or adjusting the set-points of generators
are unsuccessful. Researchers in [30] have also suggested a
reinforcement-learning-based online optimal control method
for the hybrid energy storage system in ac/dc microgrids. Fi-
nally, the authors of [5] have researched scheduling generators
in a day-ahead power system operation through a security-
constrained unit commitment model; in order to solve this
model, they have introduced a data-driven stochastic optimiza-
tion that incorporates the superiority of both stochastic and
robust approaches.
Additionally, some researchers have recently researched
some novel aspects of the cybersecurity issues in smart
grids [31]–[35]. Although secure smart world based on in-
ternet of things have wholly been discussed in [31] (and
references therein)—which is a survey article—the potentially
“unnoticeable” cyberattacks’ (CAs’) impacts on the tertiary
controls of microgrids under the umbrella of smart grids have
been overlooked. The authors in [32], [33] have discussed
false data injection into the state estimation problem of smart
grids, so the problem under study has not ever considered
how CAs are able to increase generation costs unnoticeably.
Among a lot of research on the topic mentioned earlier, [34]
has investigated optimal power flow (OPF) in smart grids, but
it is not fully applicable to an MMG with the FIPE as detailed
in the next paragraph. Also, the authors in [35] have studied
economic dispatch in a smart grid, but it has some serious
shortcomings to be able to be employed in MMGs having
FIPESs—as delineated in the second following paragraph.
As described in [6], [34], CAs affect the optimal en-
ergy management done in tertiary controls. However, the
researchers in [6], [34] have stated that none of the latest
research studies have thoroughly taken into account the CAs’
influence on the “unnoticeable” increase in generation costs
in the energy management system—optimally and mathemat-
ically. Indeed, none have considered a mathematical way to
determine the effects of CAs; notably, the data integrity attack
by CAs is the main focus here because this type of CA is not
easily recognizable. It is a CA that can significantly affect the
tertiary control by modifying data and manipulating it over a
long time. Unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification
are among the ways causing data integrity attacks. Such CAs
can cause considerable economic effects on many types of
systems (e.g., see [36]) and especially the MMGs’ operation
discussed in this article. Even though the writers of [34] have
studied data integrity attacks against OPF in smart grids, they
have not considered energy management constraints; they have
only taken into account the power equations. It is impossible
to apply their approach to MMGs (which have FIPESs and are
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able to store electrical energy) because the constraints related
to storing electrical energy cannot be considered (and should
not have been seen) in the OPF problem proposed in [34].
This limitation is because of dealing with a “power” system
in [34]—not a “power and energy” system.
Furthermore, [35] has mathematically researched dis-
tributed economic dispatch problem under attacks as well.
Albeit [35] provides a substantial mathematical background of
the problem, it has the following deficiencies. 1) Only fossil-
fuel-based generations have been considered, so renewables
have been overlooked. 2) Only ac grids have been seen.
3) Generating units based on energy-storing systems (e.g.,
BESSs) have entirely been ignored. 4) Decision-making in-
teger variables (e.g., on/off) have been disregarded. 5) Last
but not least, the impact of CAs on the generation costs have
not been formulated and mathematically shown. Regarding
the fifth point mentioned earlier, [35] is not able to provide
a clear understanding of how much CAs are able to influ-
ence generation costs. Additionally, the proposed problem
does not apply to the FIPESs of MMGs, which have a
lot of new entities communicating with the central controls.
Researchers may have well maturely researched the state
estimation problem’s vulnerabilities to the disturbances made
by data integrity attacks, data false injection attacks, and so
on in smart grids (e.g., [31]–[35]) and traffic control systems
(e.g., [37]). Nonetheless, up to the authors’ best knowledge,
there is no solid research in data integrity attacks’ effects
on the increase in generation costs—or equivalently decrease
in electrical energy efficiency—from the standpoint of both
power engineering and mathematics.
Consequently, the power industry requires new analytical
approaches to provide sufficiently accurate, qualitative infor-
mation on how CAs and cybersecurity affect tertiary con-
trols. This mathematical tool will make MMG’s cybersecurity-
related efforts more efficient and, more importantly, economi-
cally optimal. In this regard, new approaches need to be devel-
oped to indicate zones in MMGs that are more susceptible to
CAs using appropriate mathematical tools, thus incorporating
the impact of CAs into the tertiary controls of FIPES. In this
direction, this article proposes a methodology and develop an
algorithm to incorporate CAs into tertiary controls using an
innovative optimization problem that considers the maximum
available power both with and without CAs for distributed
energy resources (e.g., wind, solar, battery energy storage
systems, etc.) and loads.
For the tertiary control of the FIPES of MMGs, an opti-
mization algorithm is always involved and being developed. It
should be able to identify the most susceptible points of cy-
berattack (PoCA) associated with the data integrity attacks in
order to achieve more resilient modernized grids. Some limits
must unquestionably be taken into account. In other words, the
more susceptible entities (including ac/dc generation, BESSs,
and consumption) that impact the performance of the tertiary
control once a CA occurs must be determined. In this regard, it
is required to ensure that the objective function associated with
the operating costs is still able to give an “optimal” solution
when considering CAs.
Note that this paper investigates CAs that are not destructive
to MMGs. In other words, CAs that do not take harmful
actions (such as opening a breaker, etc.) and that solely inject
data integrity attack into the tertiary controls; Fig. 2 shows
typical CAs affecting MMG’s tertiary controls. This work also
regards the aforementioned data integrity attack by CAs as
both “severe uncertainty” and “negligible uncertainty” of the
variable under study with a “random” radius of uncertainty
(RoU). Random RoUs are able to take into account both severe
data integrity attacks and negligible ones (or undetectable
attacks). For doing so, this article considers that RoU in the
optimization process using the model proposed here. The first
main objective of this research is to formulate the impacts of
data integrity attacks on the tertiary controls of MMGs. They
have an FIPES structure with various feasible ac/dc entities
and generating units. The second one is to calculate different
RoUs to find the most vulnerable PoCAs mathematically. One
should consider that the latter objective is required to make
conservative investments in the cybersecurity for removing (or
diminishing) data integrity attack’s effects on operating costs.
It results in a better understanding of the CAs’ impacts on ter-
tiary controls. This way, investments enhancing cybersecurity
in the MMGs’ FIPES will be made rational, scientific, and
more quantitative.
This paper’s results are able to analytically (and illustra-
tively) inform design engineers of the impacts of the invest-
ments in the MMGs’ cybersecurity so that they are assured
that data integrity attacks do not endanger the economic
optimization through examining the effects of their investment.
In other words, the amount of increase in operating costs is
mathematically found and visually demonstrated. Therefore,
that cost increase will be one of the analytical bases for the cy-
bersecurity investment associated with MMGs. As regards this
matter, [38] explicitly reports, “The challenge for regulators
lies in determining whether a particular investment is prudent,
or whether other needed investments are being overlooked.
Unfortunately, many regulators lack the expertise to make
these judgments. In addition, the task is complicated by the
“public goods” nature of many cybersecurity investments. To
the extent that the benefits of a given investment (or conversely,
the costs of a failing to make the investment) extend beyond an
individual company, that company can be expected to underin-
vest from the perspective of the system as a whole. Moreover,
current regulatory processes tend to overlook systemic risks.”
Also, [39] clearly commented, “Some utilities have also asked
for oversight in the upgrading of utility cyber security systems
and the updating of cyber insurance policies. In particular,
DOE could work directly with utilities and industry suppliers
to assess cyber security investments by developing metrics
for evaluation of these investments. Additionally, DOE or
other government agencies could provide funding to cyber
security research efforts in industry, with a specific focus on
evaluating new investments in cyber security and the relative
effectiveness of these investments in protecting utilities against
cyber attacks.”
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) It derives a tertiary control for the “daily energy” man-
agement for 24 hours of the day—not solely power
management—which: i) minimizes the use of diesel
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Fig. 1. Concept of the MMG’s FIPES.
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Fig. 2. Cyberattacks impacting the controls of the FIPES of an MMG—also showing a broad overview of the areas and points that may
potentially be “cyberattacked” (e.g., by data integrity attacks) in the tertiary control.
generators; ii) reduces the amount of exchanged power
between the ac and dc grids of the MMG; iii) drives the
battery banks to be fully charged; iv) forces the battery
banks to supply any power shortage with high priority;
and v) satisfies power demand with maximum utilization
of renewable resources.
2) It mathematically models data integrity attacks into the
optimization algorithm of the tertiary control of the
FIPES of MMGs. In other words, it mathematically
considers the unnoticeable increase in generation costs
in the FIPES’s energy management system of MMGs.
3) It particularly applies applies information gap decision
theory (IGDT)—as an appropriately selected mathemat-
ical tool—to the proposed problem formulation. IGDT
helps decision makers manage uncertain systems without
the availability of statistical data of the unknown param-
eters.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the detailed tertiary control that is required to
be considered in the FIPES of MMGs. Section III elaborates
on the hypothesis, the proposed problem formulation, and
the proposed IGDT-based methodology—named cyberattack-
tolerant tertiary control (CT2C)—in the FIPES. It details the
proposed approach to both severe and negligible data integrity
attacks. Section IV describes the case studies and discusses
the simulation results for both severe and insignificant data
integrity attacks. Finally, Section IV draws conclusions based
on the findings from this research.
II. DETAILED TERTIARY CONTROL IN THE FIPES
This section mathematically describes the detailed tertiary
controls of the FIPES of an MMG. It takes into account all
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possible constraints to be included in the objective function
of the MMG’s tertiary controls. In this regard, the following
equations are able to represent the generally applied operating
cost (OC) for the tertiary control of FIPES of MMGs—
including total generation cost, active/reactive power balance,
and active power losses. It is worthy of mention that the
tertiary control taken into account here is genuinely compre-
hensive and detailed. In this regard, this paper considers the
followings: 1) active/reactive power balance, 2) active power
losses, 3) lower/upper bounds of the generating units, 4) ramp
up/down rates of the generating units, 4) the state of charge
(SOC) of BESSs, 5) the charging/discharging power of BESSs,
6) reserve capacity, and so on. These are also considered in
the unit commitment-optimal power flow [5]. The problem
mentioned above formulation can also be rewritten as follows.
Indeed, the following equation describes the operating cost
for the tertiary control of FIPES of MMGs—Subject To the







+ cgΘg,kt}∆tkt + Csupg µg,kt + Csdng λg,kt ],
(1)
Subject To:
Active Power Balance Equation:∑
g∈Gi
(Pg,ktΘg,kt) + PWi,kt + PVi,kt − PDi,kt+∑
n∈E














j,kt − 2Vi,ktVj,ktcos(δi,kt − δj,kt)),
∀i, j ∈ B,∀kt ∈ T , (3)
Reactive Power Balance Equation (Only in the AC Side):∑
g∈Gi




Vi,ktVj,ktVi,jsin(θi,j + δi,kt − δi,kt),
∀i, j ∈ B,∀kt ∈ T , (4)
Lower and Upper Bounds of Active Power of Generating
Units:
Pming Θg,kt ≤ Pg,kt ≤ Pmaxg Θg,kt , ∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (5)
Lower and Upper Bounds of Reactive Power of Generating
Units (Only in the AC Side):
Qming Θg,kt ≤ Qg,kt ≤ Qmaxg Θg,kt , ∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (6)
Ramp-up Rate of Generating Units:
Pg,kt+∆tkt − Pg,kt ≤ R
up
g ∆tkt + µg,kt+∆tktP
min
g ,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (7)
Ramp-down Rate of Generating Units:
Pg,kt − Pg,kt+∆tkt ≤ R
dn
g ∆tkt + λg,kt+∆tktP
min
g ,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (8)
Minimum Up-Time Constraint:
[T ong,kt−∆tkt − T
up
g ][Θg,kt −Θg,kt−∆tkt ] ≥ 0,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (9)
Minimum Down-Time Constraint:
[T offg,kt−∆tkt − T
dn
g ][Θg,kt−∆tkt −Θg,kt ] ≥ 0,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (10)
Start-up and Shut-down Decisions:
µg,kt − λg,kt = Θg,kt −Θg,kt−∆tkt , ∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (11)
Constraint on Not Turning On and Off A Generating Unit
Simultaneously:
µg,kt + λg,kt ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (12)
BESS’s SOC’s Equation Using Charging/Discharging Power
and Efficiency:








∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (13)
SOC Lower and Upper Bounds of the BESSs:
SOCminn ≤ SOCn,kt ≤ SOCmaxn , ∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (14)
BESS’s Maximum Charging Power:




n,kt , ∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (15)
BESS’s Maximum Discharging Power:




n,kt , ∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (16)




n,kt ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (17)
Spinning Reserve Constraint:∑
g∈G
(Pmaxg − Pg,kt)Θg,kt ≥ RESkt , ∀kt ∈ T , (18)
Constraint on the Lines’ Power Flow:
Si,j,kt(|Vi|, |δi|, |Vj |, |δj |) ≤ Smaxi,j , ∀i, j ∈ B, (19)
Constraint on Voltage Limits Related to Power Flow:
V min ≤ Vi,kt ≤ V max, ∀kt ∈ T , (20)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION OF THE PROPOSED
CYBERATTACKS-TOLERANT TERTIARY CONTROL IN THE
FIPES
This section mathematically details the proposed
cyberattacks-tolerant tertiary control, which is based on
IGDT methodology. Therefore, the considered Hypothesis
is first described before providing the proposed approach’s
details.
Hypothesis. When a data integrity attack—either a severe
or negligible (equivalently undetectable) attack one—occurs,
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there is a change in the operating cost of OC. This amount
of change [in percentage or per unit (pu)] is formulated
by a variable named δCA in this paper, which is defined
as the tolerable increment in operating cost considering the
vulnerability of tertiary controls to cyberattacks. For Severe
Data Integrity Attacks, the “new” operating cost of OCnew
is considered, and the optimization process ensures that it is
“below” (1 + δCA)OC∗, or equivalently, the change in the
new operating cost is less that δCA×100%. In (1 + δCA)OC∗,
OC∗ is the operating costs without any attacks (presented
in Section II). Therefore, it is possible to find the random
“RoU”s associated with various entities if targeted by CA.
That random RoU is regarded as an uncertain piece of
information that is handled by the IGDT methodology when
considered in the IGDT-based tertiary control. Subsequently,
by finding the maximum RoU, while considering the constraint
of OCnew ≤ (1 + δCA) × OC∗, it is feasible to “quantify”
the amount of change in the operating cost of OC provided
that severe data integrity attacks happen. For Negligible Data
Integrity Attacks, a similar maximizing problem is considered,
but there are additional constraints on each of the RoUs
associated with all entities constructing the MMGs’ FIPES.
Those extra constraints will be limited to small values (during
the maximization process) so that negligible data integrity
attacks are taken into account.
According to the Hypothesis above, the IGDT approach
is the key to the method proposed in this article. Then,
Subsection III-A briefly elaborates on the concepts behind
the IGDT methodology. Afterward, Subsection III-B thor-
oughly expresses the mathematics required for formulating
this research’s Hypothesis. Finally, Subsection IV provides the
outcomes to support the Hypothesis described here.
A. IGDT Approach
The uncertain systems, for which the statistical data of
uncertain parameters is unavailable, are well-managed by the
IGDT [40]. Various approaches can be adopted in the IGDT.
They include risk-averse strategy and risk-taking strategy. In
the former, the decision maker tries to minimize the operation
risk, while in the the latter, the objective is to maximize the
profit via minimizing variable operating costs. In the risk-
averse approach, uncertainty negatively impacts the system,
and an appropriate robustness band should be defined to
achieve a safer operation [40]. In this paper, the risk-averse
strategy, in which the uncertainty increases the operating cost,
is employed to determine the robustness regions of uncertain
parameters.
The uncertainty can be expressed in two different aspects
because the uncertainty-made deviations are either favorable
or adverse. Adversity increases the possibility of failure, while
the opportunity to succeed is referred to as favorability. In
the IGDT, “immunity functions” are abel to present nega-
tive or positive effects of uncertainty. A robustness function
defined the immunity to failure. The robustness function—
i.e., robustness band—is the uncertainty’s largest amount for
which the occurrence of failure is impossible. Let us assume
that Π(χkt , ϕ1,kt , ϕ2,kt , ..., ϕn,kt) denotes the system model,
indicating the input/output structure of the system. Besides,
χkt is the set of decision variables at each time interval,
while ϕz,kt denotes the system’s uncertain parameters. In the
IGDT, various ways are able to express uncertain parameters,
as described in [40]. This research uses the envelope bound
model as follows.
ϕz,kt ∈ ψz,kt(κz, ϕ̃z,kt), ∀z ∈ Z,∀kt ∈ T ,
ψz,kt(κz, ϕ̃z,kt) =
∣∣∣∣∣ϕz,kt − ϕ̃z,ktϕ̃z,kt
∣∣∣∣∣ < κz, (21)
where ϕz,kt denotes the system’s z
th uncertain parameter;
ϕ̃z,kt describes its predicted value; ψz,kt(κz, ϕ̃z,kt) indicates
the set of all ϕz,kt ’s values; and κz shows the uncertain
parameter z’s uncertainty horizon.
The uncertainty horizon’s largest value, in which all sys-
tem’s minimum requirements remain satisfied, expresses the




{κz}, ∀z ∈ Z,
min
{




where R̃z is the uncertain parameter z’s robustness band, and
Πmin is the set of all system’s minimum requirements.
B. Proposed Mathematical Formulation with Cyberattack Im-
pacts
In the proposed CT2C (which uses IGDT employed in the
FIPES of MMGs), the goal is to reduce the operating cost of
the MMG, i.e., the function of OC considering the 24-hour
energy consumption, not only the power consumption. This
methodology allows for better energy management related to
the OC of MMG. This OC is the cost of operation for different
time intervals associated with generating units. During this
process, all equality and inequality constraints that consider
power flow and technical limitations related to the operation
of different generating units will be taken into account.
1) Without Any Limits on RoUs to Consider Severe Data
Integrity Attacks: In this part, “sever” data integrity attacks
are considered. In this regard, there are no limits on RoUs
so that they can take and reach any numbers during the
optimization process. In other words, the optimization process
is more relaxed compared to the next subsection. To this
end, Subsubsection III-B1 proposes two key, integral steps as
follows. It is noteworthy that this subsubsection will be vital
to the next one, which takes into account a limit on RoUs so
that negligible (or extremely non-detectable) attacks are seen
(or undetectable attacks) as well.
Stage A—In the first stage, (2)–(20) are able to determine
the minimum OC over 24 hours with a step size of one hour.
Therefore, (2)–(20) provide the generation amounts for the
one-hour time intervals, which is flexible and can be altered. In
other words, they provide all the generation amounts, including
BESSs, in addition to the OC for 24 hours reflecting the
energy generation’s OCs and the operating costs of OC∗. In
other words, OC∗ conveys the MMG’s operating costs—when
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there are not any data integrity attacks by CAs. Then, any data
integrity attacks will cause the OC∗ to be increased. Stage B
is able to capture that part in a mathematically efficient way.
Stage B—In the second stage, (23)–(37) are able to take into
account the data integrity attacks’ effect on the tertiary control
of the FIPES using the CT2C proposed here. In this regard, this
work supposes that the CAs cause an increase in the OC∗ with
δCA as the tolerable increment in operating costs considering
the vulnerability of the tertiary control to data integrity attacks.
This consideration leads to a new OCnew describing the impact
of CAs by employing a portion of OC∗ calculated in the first
stage—described by (24). Equation (24) mathematically states
that if one wants to keep the newly impacted OC below the
amount calculated in Stage A, how much deviation could have
happened in the amount of generation (and/or load), supposing
that data integrity attack has been injected into the amounts
communicated via the FIPES’s tertiary controls. This way,
OCnew, which is the OC impacted by CAs, is kept below
(1 + δCA)× 100%. OCnew is able to tell engineers about this
statement that “if the OC is increased by δCA, what will the
new generation (and/or load) be, and thereby, by how much
should the new generation (and/or load) be increased?” In
other words, given δCA, the new generation amounts can be
found by an RoU. One is able to calculate the RoU for all
units associated with the generation, load, BESS, etc. in the
FIPES’s structure. Afterward, the RoUs associated with all of
the entities above are maximized using IGDT to find the most
vulnerable PoCAs considering the amount of increase in OC.
As shown in (23), KDG, KBESS, KPV, KWT, and KLoad are the
aforementioned RoUs related to diesel generating units [or
equivalently diesel gensets (DGs)], BESS units, photovoltaic
(PV) units, wind turbine (WT) units, and loads, respectively.
Next, (30)–(37), which are the appropriately updated versions
of (1)–(16), are able to deal with the new generation amount
affected by RoUs. Consequently, they mathematically consider
the influence of CAs on the tertiary control of the FIPES.
Now, as described above in Stage A and Stage B, in the
second level of modeling, the effect of CAs is considered by
employing an additional uncertain variable that is able to take
into account the data integrity attack by CAs. Then, the new
variable—which is able to model the effect of CAs on the
OC mathematically—results in the following equations. They
include a “new” OC, as well as constraints regarding CAs.
With respect to all of the constraints, (23) is the critical part
that is able to handle the CAs’ impact on the tertiary control




















Constraint on Maximum Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on
the Operating Cost of OC:
OCnew ≤ (1 + δCA)OC∗, (24)
Constraint on the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on Diesel
Gensets:
P newg,kt = (1−KDG)Pg,kt∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T , (25)
Constraint on the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on Wind
Turbine Generations:
PW newj,kt = (1−KWT)PWj,kt∀j ∈ BWT,∀kt ∈ T , (26)
Constraint on the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on Photo-
voltaic Systems:
PV newi,kt = (1−KPV)PVi,kt∀i ∈ BPV,∀kt ∈ T , (27)
Constraint on the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on Battery
Energy Storage Systems:
P dch,newn,kt = (1−KBESS)P
dch
n,kt∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (28)
Constraint on the Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on Loads:
PDnewl,kt = (1 +KLoad)PDl,kt∀l ∈ BL,∀kt ∈ T , (29)
















New Active Power Balance:∑
g∈Gi















Vi,ktVj,ktYi,jcos(θi,j + δj,kt − δi,kt)∀i, j,∀kt,
(31)
New Aeactive Power Balance Equation (Only in the AC Side):
Pming Θg,kt ≤ P newg,kt ≤ P
max
g Θg,kt ,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T ,
(32)
New Ramp-up Rate of Generating Units:
P newg,kt+∆tkt
− P newg,kt ≤ R
up
g ∆tkt + µg,kt+∆tktP
min
g ,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T ,
(33)
New Ramp-down Rate of Generating Units:
P newg,kt − P
new
g,kt+∆tkt
≤ Rdng ∆tkt + λg,kt+∆tktP
min
g ,
∀g ∈ G,∀kt ∈ T ,
(34)









∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T ,
(35)
New SOC Lower and Upper Bounds of the BESSs:
SOCminn ≤ SOCnewn,kt ≤ SOC
max
n ∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T , (36)
New BESS’s Maximum Discharging Power:




n,kt∀n ∈ E ,∀kt ∈ T (37)
Consequently, by considering CAs in the tertiary control of
FIPES using the CT2C proposed in (23)–(37), this research is
able to find the most susceptible PoCAs mathematically. Those
PoCAs are associated with all entities forming the FIPES, not
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only for the generating units but also for the loads. They can
dramatically influence the operating costs of an MMG with
an FIPES structure, and the RoUs defined above are able to
describe the susceptibility of various entities to CAs. Indeed, if
the CA impacts a given entity with the RoU, its impact on the
operating cost is not higher than δCA. It means that “the higher”
the RoU, “the lesser” the effect on the FIPES’s tertiary control
caused by CAs. This statement will be true because the effect
of changes in the amount of generation/consumption within the
RoU is not higher than δCA. In order to display the proposed
method in this subsection, Fig. 3 shows the flowchart of the
detailed process explained above using a stepwise process.
2) With Limits on RoUs to Consider Negligible Data
Integrity Attacks: In this part, studies associated with the
negligible data integrity attacks—regarded as extremely non-
detectable CAs (or equivalently undetectable CAs)—have been
provided. To this end, in direct contrast to what has been done
in Subsubsection III-B1, there do exist limits on RoUs. Con-
sequently, they should now be regarded as “new” constraints
in the optimization process. In other words, the optimization
process is not as relaxed as what is in the earlier subsection. In
this regard, KDG, KBESS, KPV, KWT, and KLoad are included in
the constraints of (38)–(42) in this subsubsection as follows. In






WT , and K
max
Load are selected
according to the minimum effect that data integrity attacks
should have on operating costs. Obviously, the less they are
selected to be, the higher cybersecurity investments should
be made. In this subsection, the values of 1%, 2%, 3%, and






WT , and K
max
Load as
they show very less impact caused by data integrity attacks
via CAs. All can be equal without loss of generality here. In
this subsection, because of the fact that higher resolutions are
required, the 5-minute time intervals (equal to 288 intervals
during a 24-hour time window) are considered. In order to
demonstrate the proposed approach in this subsection, illus-
tratively, Fig. 4 shows the flowchart of the detailed process
explained above using a stepwise methodology.
Constraint on Diesel Gensets’ RoUs:
KDG ≤ KmaxDG , (38)
Constraint on Photovoltaic Systems’ RoUs:
KWT ≤ KmaxWT , (39)
Constraint on Wind Turbine Generations’ RoUs:
KPV ≤ KmaxPV , (40)
Constraint on Battery Energy Storage Systems’ RoUs:
KBESS ≤ KmaxBESS, (41)
Constraint on Loads’ RoUs:
KLoad ≤ KmaxLoad, (42)
IV. OUTCOMES AND CONSIDERED CASE STUDIES
A CIGRE microgrid test system is employed to simulate
the results and find the outcomes of the proposed IGDT-
based tertiary control [41], as depicted in Fig. 5. This CIGRE
microgrid is a big, multi-busbar microgrid. It also features an
FIPES and requires considerable communication infrastructure
TABLE I
DATA FOR THE MICROGRID DIESEL GENSETS IN FIG. 5.
Parameter DG #1 DG #2 DG #3 DG #4 DG #5
ag [$/(kWh)2] 0.00015 0.00025 0.00015 0.00010 0.0005
bg [$/kWh] 0.2881 0.2876 0.2571 0.224 0.3476
cg [$/h] 7.5 0 25.5 45.5 0
c
sup
g [$] 15 7.35 45 95 10
csdng [$] 5.3 1.44 8.3 15.3 0
R
up
g [kW/h] 2000 600 1800 3200 450
Rdng [kW/h] 3500 1500 3000 4000 1000
Pmaxg [kW] 5000 1500 4000 6000 1000
Pming [kW] 180 100 150 200 100
for its operation to be utilized as an MMG. It consists of diesel
generating units (or equivalently diesel gensets), BESS units,
WTs, and PV systems.
It has a total capacity of 26.50 MW, whose details are as
follows. The total installed capacities of the diesel gensets [five
units (three of which have been connected to Bus #B1), WTs
(three units), and PV systems (eight units) are 17500, 8000,
and 1000 kW, respectively. Besides, it has been equipped with
two battery energy storage systems—totaling 2000 kW. Table I
provides the data of diesel gensets used in this work. Other
typical parameters associated with grid components, such as
BESS units, WTs, PV units, and so forth, are available in
Fig. 5. Note that because the “performance” of the forecasting
system is not within the scope of this paper, the proposed
IGDT-based tertiary control is intended to (and is able to)
work with the output of any forecasting system with adequate
performance.
A. Proposed Method’s Results for Severe Data Integrity At-
tacks
The proposed IGDT-based algorithm (shown in Fig. 3) is
employed in the tertiary control of the FIPES using a General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), a high-level modeling
system for mathematical optimization [42]. The model is a
mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem, so
the GAMS’ MINLP solver can solve it. The GAMS modeling
system has been running on an Intel R© CPU Core i7-4700HQ
2.4 GHz PC with 8 GB of RAM. It has run the optimization
algorithm by the MINLP solver in non-real-time using C++,
and it has been installed on the Windows 10 operating system.
Note that, here, finding the globally optimal solutions has been
guaranteed [43].
The data of the CIGRE microgrid test system in Fig. 5
is used in order to demonstrate the outcomes of the proposed
IGDT-based tertiary control described in Subsubsection III-B1.
Solving the proposed model in a 24-hour time window with
a step size of one hour is considered here. This subsection
comprehensively considers several scenarios, including vari-
ous values regarding δCA and different PoCAs, i.e., different
generating units, load sections, and both. Table II summarizes
those scenarios; scenarios S1x, and S2x, and S3x are related to
the inclusion of both generating units and load sections, only
generating units, and only load sections, respectively—where
x ∈ {1, ..., 6} shows the number with respect to the amount
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Objective Function: Equation (1) 
Subject to: Equations (2) to (20)
Output Data:
Stage B: Radius of Uncertainty Maximization
Input Data:
δCA, Outputs of Stage A
Optimization:
Objective Function: Equation (23) 
Subject to: Equations (24) to (37)
Output Data:
*/ , / , , / , ,
t t t t t t t tg,k g,k l,k l,k i,k j,k j,k n,k
P Q PD QD PV PW QW SOC OC
new new new new new new new new new/ , / , , / , ,
t t t t t t t tg,k g,k l,k l,k i,k j,k j,k n,k
P Q PD QD PV PW QW SOC OC
dn up dn up min max sdn sup max min
n n
/ , / , / , / , / , / / , ,
tg g g g g g g g g g g k i, j
R R T T P P C C SOC SOC a b c RES Y
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the proposed approach of CT2C using stepwise methodology in Subsubsection III-B1.
of δCA in %. Figs. 6–11 depict the thorough outcomes of the
CT2C proposed in this subsection.
B. Proposed Method’s Results for Negligible Data Integrity
Attacks
Similarly, the proposed IGDT-based algorithm (shown in
Fig. 4) is employed in the tertiary control of the FIPES using
GAMS again [42]. Again, the GAMS modeling system has
been running on an Intel R© CPU Core i7-4700HQ 2.4 GHz
PC with 8 GB of RAM. Likewise, it has run the optimization
algorithm by the MIQCP solver in non-real-time using C++,
and it has been installed on the Windows 10 operating system.
Note that, here, finding the globally optimal solutions has been
guaranteed as well [43].
The data of the CIGRE microgrid test system in Fig. 5
is used in order to demonstrate the outcomes of the proposed
IGDT-based tertiary control presented in Subsubsection III-B1.
Because of considering “negligible” (or non-detectable) data
integrity attacks, solving the proposed methodology in a 24-
hour time window with a step size of five minutes is considered
here. This subsection comprehensively considers all scenar-
ios, including very small values regarding δCA and different
PoCAs, i.e., both different generating units and load sections.
Table III summarizes the natural numbers that assigned to
different entities (i.e., various generating units and loads) and
used in the outcomes. The scenarios S4x (reported in Table IV)
are related to the inclusion of both generating units and load
section—where x ∈ {1, ..., 4} shows the number with respect







WT , and K
max
Load. Figs. 12 and 13 detail
the outcomes of the CT2C proposed in this subsection.
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Objective Function: Equation (1) 
Subject to: Equations (2) to (20)
Output Data:
Stage B: Radius of Uncertainty Maximization
Input Data:
δCA, Outputs of Stage A and
Optimization:
Objective Function: Equation (23) 
Subject to: Equations (24) to (37) and Equations (38) to (42)
Output Data:
*/ , / , , / , ,
t t t t t t t tg,k g,k l,k l,k i,k j,k j,k n,k
P Q PD QD PV PW QW SOC OC
new new new new new new new new new/ , / , , / , ,
t t t t t t t tg,k g,k l,k l,k i,k j,k j,k n,k
P Q PD QD PV PW QW SOC OC
dn up dn up min max sdn sup max min
n n
/ , / , / , / , / , / / , ,
tg g g g g g g g g g g k i, j
R R T T P P C C SOC SOC a b c RES Y
max max max max max
DG WT PV BESS Load
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the proposed approach of CT2C using stepwise methodology in Subsubsection III-B2.
C. Discussions about the Results from the Proposed CT2C
This subsection details the discussions about the results
of the proposed algorithms for both severe and negligible
uncertainties caused by data integrity attacks through the
following subsections.
1) Proposed Method’s Results for Severe Data Integrity
Attacks: Figs. 6 and 7 reveal the CAs’ impacts on the
OC of tertiary control when S1x scenarios happen.
They are data integrity attacks affecting both generating
units (i.e., those in Buses # B1, B9, B13︸ ︷︷ ︸
for DGs
; B5, B6, B8︸ ︷︷ ︸
for WTs
;
B3, B4, B5, B6, B8, B9, B10, B11︸ ︷︷ ︸
for PVs
; and B5, B10︸ ︷︷ ︸
for BESSs
) and
load sections (i.e., those in Buses B2, B3, B4, B5,
B6, B8, B10, B11, B12, and B13). Those have been
assigned to columns C#1, C#2, C#3︸ ︷︷ ︸
for DGs
; C#4, C#5, C#6︸ ︷︷ ︸
for WTs
;
C#7, C#8, C#9, C#10, C#11, C#12, C#13, C#14︸ ︷︷ ︸
for PVs
;
C#15, C#16︸ ︷︷ ︸
for BESSs
; C#17︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B2
; C#18︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B3
; C#19︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B4
;
C#20︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B5
; C#21︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B6
; C#22︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B8
; C#23︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B10
;
C#24︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B11
; C#25︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B12
; C#26︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B13
; in Fig. 6, respectively.
Fig. 6 shows the map associated with tertiary controls
impacted for different hours of the 24-hour time window while
Fig. 7 reveals the impacts for the entire day. Figs. 6 and 7 (the
part assigned to δCA = 1%) show that, for the scope of the
research under investigation and in the FIPES under study,
the DGs are the first most susceptible PoCAs; the BESSs are
the second most sensitive ones; the WTs are the third most
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Fig. 5. Single-line diagram of the CIGRE microgrid benchmark [41].
vulnerable points; and the PVs are the least susceptible PoCAs.
Figs. 8 and 9 reveal the same information regarding the CAs’
impacts on the OC of tertiary control for the S2x scenarios,
in which CA injects data integrity attack into only generating
units. Last, but by no means least, Figs. 10 and 11 reveal the
impacts of CAS on the OC of tertiary control for the S3x
scenarios, in which CA injects data integrity attack into only
the load sections. Figs. 10 and 11 demonstrate that the CAs
in the load sections have almost the same impact on the OC
of the tertiary control. However, the load close to DG #5 are
more susceptible to CAs than other loads.
Finally, Fig. 14 has shown how the method proposed in
Subsubsection III-B1 can be employed to invest money in
cybersecurity enhancements of the FIPES of MMGs. Using
a stepwise approach effectively provides designers with a
flowchart to be able to compare the increases in operating costs
(through a decrease in electrical energy efficiency caused by
severe data integrity attacks) with the expenses of investments
in cybersecurity.
2) Proposed Method’s Results for Extremely Non-
Detectable Data Integrity Attacks: Figs. 12 and 13
demonstrate the CAs’ effects on the OC when S4x scenarios
happen. They are data integrity attacks influencing both
generating units (i.e., those in Buses # B1, B9, B13︸ ︷︷ ︸
for DGs
;
B5, B6, B8︸ ︷︷ ︸
for WTs
; B3, B4, B5, B6, B8, B9, B10, B11︸ ︷︷ ︸
for PVs
; and
B5, B10︸ ︷︷ ︸
for BESSs
) and load sections (i.e., those in Buses B2, B3, B4,
B5, B6, B8, B10, B11, B12, and B13). Those have been
assigned to columns C#1, C#2, C#3︸ ︷︷ ︸
for DGs
; C#4, C#5, C#6︸ ︷︷ ︸
for WTs
;
C#7, C#8, C#9, C#10, C#11, C#12, C#13, C#14︸ ︷︷ ︸
for PVs
;
C#15, C#16︸ ︷︷ ︸
for BESSs
; C#17︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B2
; C#18︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B3
; C#19︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B4
;
C#20︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B5
; C#21︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B6
; C#22︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B8
; C#23︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B10
;
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Fig. 6. Comparative results of scenario S11 within the 24-hour time window (with 1-hour intervals), presented as 3D surface and its wireframe
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Fig. 7. Comparative results of scenarios S11, S12, S13, S14, S15, and S16 for the entire 24 hours in the form of 3D columns (note that BE
stands for battery energy storage system because of having insufficient space here).
C#24︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B11
; C#25︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B12
; C#26︸ ︷︷ ︸
for Load @ B13
; in Figs. 12 and 13,
respectively, as reported in Table III.
They illustrate the map associated with tertiary controls
impacted for different hours of the 24-hour time window with
5-minute time intervals increasing the resolution. As Table IV
details, the data integrity attacks—which have been considered
by RoUmaxs of 4%, 3%, 2%, and 1%—increase the operating
costs by 17%, 13%, 9%, and 4%, respectively—for sure,
the lower RoUmax, the higher cybersecurity investments are
required. Also, Figs. 12 and 13 similarly show that, for the
scope of the research under study and in the FIPES under
investigation, the DGs are the first most susceptible PoCAs;
the BESSs are the second most sensitive ones; the WTs are
the third most vulnerable points; and the PVs are the least
susceptible PoCAs.
Eventually, Fig. 15 has shown how the methodology elab-
orated in Subsubsection III-B2 can be used in investing
funds in cybersecurity improvements of the FIPES of MMGs.
Employing a stepwise method effectively provides designers
with a flowchart to be able to make a comparison between the
increases in operating costs (which are caused by negligible
data integrity attacks) and the required money that should be
invested in cybersecurity improvement.
D. Proposed Method’s Practicability
This research has not contributed to the primary or zero-
level control of a single converter (i.e., device-level controls)
so that a single VSC is required to be tested. Also, it has not
contributed to the secondary control of multiple, connected
converters so that few VSCs are needed to be examined either.
If this work is related to either case stated above, with the
currently owned devices (e.g., the pieces of equipment applied
in [3], [7], [15]), it will be practicable to conduct the tests
associated with those controls using either a single converter
or multiple ones. Instead, this work has, however, researched
tertiary controls and studied the cyberattack’s impacts on the
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Fig. 8. Comparative results of scenario S22 within the 24-hour time window (with 1-hour intervals), presented as 3D surface and its wireframe
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Fig. 9. Comparative results of scenarios S21, S22, S23, S24, S25, and S26 for the entire 24 hours in the form of 3D columns.
microgrids’ operating costs with the details mentioned in the
article.
Moreover, in this research, it has been required to apply the
per-unit numbers associated with operating costs—with the
base of OC∗ (i.e., operating costs for “without”-cyberattack
conditions) as per this paper’s contributions and requirements,
which have been described in the write-up. Therefore, this
paper’s outcomes have been the increases in operating costs
with respect to the base of OC∗.
On top of that, it has been dealing with a considerably
huge microgrid—compared to the laboratory-scale facilities
available to us—since there is a significant power system
associated with the MMG under investigation. On the one
hand, it is also true that making a pilot microgrid can be an
option for experiments—but on the other hand, it is noteworthy
that the facilities and the budget required for implementing
such a microgrid make this alternative infeasible. All in all, it
is impossible to achieve that system by physical devices con-
sidering our facilities. More importantly, based on this paper’s
scope, it is not required to arrange testing methods similar to
what should be done for controlling a single converter or even
a few (see [3], [7], [15]).
As a result, alternatively, the only possible option available
to this work in order to assure readers that everything is
implementable is real-time-simulation-based studies of such
a system (including power components, controls, and so on.).
This technique, which is based on real-time simulations, shows
that it is feasible—as a proof of concept—or not. It will be
utilized in many industrial and pilot projects before commis-
sioning them in order to de-risk the implementation phase.
As per the real-time simulation platform that is currently
available to this work, the entire system is implementable in
the NovaCor-based digital real-time simulation platform from
RTDS Technologies Inc. [44].
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Fig. 10. Comparative results of scenario S33 within the 24-hour time window (with 1-hour intervals), presented as 3D surface and its


































































































Fig. 11. Comparative results of scenarios S3 , S32, S33, S34, S35, and S36 for the entire 24 hours in the form of 3D columns.
Consequently, the implementation of such a system, includ-
ing its controls, on an industrial digital real-time simulation
platform (e.g., the NovaCor-based RTDS Platform here) re-
veals a proof of concept. In this regard, faulty signals (in
percentage based on the nominal values) have been added
to the measurement of each entity’s active/reactive power.
This action emulates and replicates the data integrity attack
(via an “emulated” cyberattack with the presumed change in
data), which impacts the measurements from those entities.
In the arranged tests, the RoUs stated in Subsections IV-A
and IV-B have been used, and δCA have been calculated and
considered as per Subsubsections III-B1 and III-B2. Because
of the fact that the RTDS Platform applies the same parameters
for modeling the system as those of the model in Fig. 5, the
power flows in both power networks are matched and become
identical. As a consequence, the same results have been
captured and obtained. Fig. 16 shows the detailed information
on the above discussion.
One step further is that a new research and development
(R & D) project is defined and proposed. In that R & D
project, the real-time-simulated system portrayed above starts
communicating with another system under “virtual” cyberat-
tack (via an industrially emulated data integrity attack made
by a third party). This process will also take advantage of one
of the hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) techniques. Afterward, the
data is captured for comparison purposes. The saved data is
then analyzed for the cyberattack’s influences on the operating
costs and comparing them with the expenses required for
cybersecurity investments.
Regarding the accurate implementation and practical aspects
of the proposed approach, it is noteworthy that this part
requires a separate, pilot R & D project based on flowcharts
portrayed in Figs. 14 and 15. To this end, based on Figs. 14
and 15, a team of experts is required to provide the costs
for improvements in the cybersecurity of the most susceptible
points of attacks—elaborated in Subsubsections IV-C1 and
Authorized licensed use limited to: Aalborg Universitetsbibliotek. Downloaded on August 17,2020 at 06:26:15 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
2168-6777 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JESTPE.2020.3015447, IEEE Journal




















Different Entities’ # 


































Fig. 12. Comparative results of scenario S4x within the 24-hour time window (with 5-minute intervals), presented as 3D surface and its
wireframe contour—Table III has reported the entity’s name associated with the individual natural number assigned to each Bus B# in the
wireframe contour’s X-axis.
Fig. 13. Comparative results of scenarios S41, S42, S43, and S44 for the entire 24 hours (with 5-minute intervals) in the form of 3D
columns—Table III has reported the entity’s name associated with the individual natural number assigned to each Bus B# in the 3D plot’s
Y -axis.
IV-C2. Equivalently, the expenses for the cybersecurity invest-
ments in those points are provided. Then, in order to ensure
that the operating costs increase in less than δCA × 100%,
the expenses of cybersecurity investments in achieving such a
security will be compared with those of the additional costs
caused by cyberattacks (via data integrity attacks).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced a novel tertiary control method-
ology to consider both severe and negligible uncertainties
caused by data integrity attacks into the tertiary controls of
modernized microgrids. Those attacks have been increasing
generation costs—or equivalently decreasing electrical energy
efficiency. To this end, a hypothesis has been provided in the
article; it has accounted for both severe data integrity attacks
and negligible ones (may also be known as undetectable at-
tacks). As elaborated in the hypothesis, the proposed approach
is based on IGDT. The IGDT-based method has taken into
account the cyberattacks’ impacts on modernized microgrids’
operating costs. This research has contributed to the field of
tertiary control of the FIPES of MMGs as follows. 1) It has
derived a tertiary control for the daily energy management that
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Fig. 14. Application of the proposed approach of CT2C in Subsubsection III-B1 shown by the flowchart using a stepwise methodology.
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Fig. 15. Application of the proposed approach of CT2C in Subsubsection III-B2 shown by the flowchart using a stepwise methodology.
optimally utilizes diesel generators, renewables, and battery
energy storage systems. 2) It has mathematically modeled the
cyberattacks into the optimization algorithm so that the most
susceptible points of a cyberattack are found—concerning the
operating costs of an MMG with the FIPES. 3) It has illus-
tratively shown those pieces of information using appropriate
maps and graphs. Illustrated by various flowcharts (stepwise
methodologies), this paper’s outcomes have also been able to
inform design engineers of the investments in the MMGs’
cybersecurity to ensure accuracy and economic optimization
via an analytical and demonstrative approach.
Furthermore, the future work will include inspecting the
FIPES-based MMG’s power topology and finding its impact
on the operating costs considering data integrity attack using
advanced mathematical tools. Future research will also need
to take into account additional, possible, relevant constraints,
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Fig. 16. Demonstration of real-time simulations of the system shown Fig. 5.
TABLE II
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF CT2C IN SUBSUBSECTION III-B1.
Scenario number δCA [%] Gen Load
S1x Scenarios—both generating units and load sections
S11 200 Yes Yes
S12 100 Yes Yes
S13 50 Yes Yes
S14 10 Yes Yes
S15 5 Yes Yes
S16 1 Yes Yes
S2x Scenarios—only generating units
S21 200 Yes No
S22 100 Yes No
S23 50 Yes No
S24 10 Yes No
S25 5 Yes No
S26 1 Yes No
S3x Scenarios—only load sections
S31 200 No Yes
S32 100 No Yes
S33 50 No Yes
S34 10 No Yes
S35 5 No Yes
S36 1 No Yes
thereby making the optimization process more constrained. To
this end, it also mathematically investigates the convex/non-
convex issues associated with the “more” constrained opti-
mization problems while data integrity attacks are seen. Last
but not least, apart from the elaborated proof of concept, one
of the HIL-based techniques is able to involve emulated data
TABLE III
NATURAL NUMBERS ASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT MMG’S
ENTITIES IN FIGS. 12 AND 13 IN SUBSUBSECTION III-B2.
Number Bus#-Entity Number Bus#-Entity
1 B1-DG 2 B9-DG
3 B13-DG 4 B5-WT
5 B6-WT 6 B8-WT
7 B3-PV 8 B4-PV
9 B5-PV 10 B6-PV
11 B8-PV 12 B9-PV
13 B10-PV 14 B11-PV
15 B5-BESS 16 B10-BESS
17 B2-Load 18 B3-Load
19 B4-Load 20 B5-Load
21 B6-Load 22 B8-Load
23 B10-Load 24 B11-Load
25 B12-Load 26 B13-Load
TABLE IV
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF
CT2C IN SUBSUBSECTION III-B2.
Scenario number RoUmaxs1 [%] OC
new
OC∗ × 100 [%] Gen Load
S4x Scenarios—both generating units and load sections
S41 4 117 Yes Yes
S42 3 113 Yes Yes
S43 2 109 Yes Yes
S44 1 104 Yes Yes
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integrity attached in the simulation process. Next, more realist,
practical implementation of the proposed control via a pilot
R & D project is required to be studied and investigated as
research activities in the future. Subsection IV-D has outlined
the possible, pilot R & D project.
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